The affirmative discourse of danger on water institutes a broader process of environmental securitization where environmental degradation begins to be represented as a threat. This process has empirically legitimized the domination and oppression of southern societies, which turns case.
Anton du Plessis, Department Header, Institute for Security Studies [South African Organization], 2K, Green Cross International and AWIRU, African Dialogue Monograph Series No. 2, Water Wars: Enduring Myth or Impending Reality, “Charting the Course of the Water Discourse through the Fog of International Relations Theory,” Google Scholar.
Thirdly, the water discourse is concerned with, and inextricably linked to, the concept of security. This concern extends to environmental security in general, and to water security in particular. This latter focus, and its collateral theoretical conceptualizations are forced upon the scene by specifically linking the water discourse – in this publication – to the war/peace and conflict/cooperation problematique, and by considering water to be a poten-tial source or cause of (violent) conflict. This idea, although not new, has become more widespread since the end of the Cold War. The result is the emergence of a new strategic imperative expressed by the term ‘environ- mental security’. This addresses the environmental factors behind potentially violent conflicts, and the impact of global environmental degradation on the well-being of societies and economies (Porter 1998:215). This development is, in part, the result of the ‘new’ security paradigm that has broadened and deepened the security agenda by including non-military (‘low-politics’) threats, as well as non-state, security stakeholders at all levels of society. Hence, it is also linked to the notion of common security, which has as its foundation common interests that, at a minimum, requires a shared interest in survival (Butfoy 1997:126). Irrespective of the fact that post-1989 security has acquired a wider meaning than protection from military threat, its broader conceptualisation has paradoxically contributed to the securitisation and militarisation of water as a traditional non-military concern. Consequently, socio-cultural factors have been overlooked, and even suppressed. The arguments about global dangers are understood in very different terms by the south, which is often regarded as a main source of these ‘new threats’ (Dalby 1998:183). Part of this concern is due to the debate about environmental security, which also involves sustainable development as a formulation that can allow injustice and environmental degradation to continue as part of the ideologically refurbished processes of development, as well as the processes of enclosure and displacement that divide up and control space. Thus viewed from the south, the ‘discourses of danger’ that structure the environmental security literature are often seen as attempts to reassert domination of southern societies, albeit in the name of protecting the planet (Dalby 1998:183-185). Also linked to this is the politics of securitisation, which is seen as an attempt to take the politics out of water, but has perhaps ultimately benefited the security of international actors more than that of the intended local beneficiaries. Warner (1999a/b) argues that a repoliticising and desecuritisng process will be necessary in order for progress to be made. However, in the words of Butfoy (1997:130), although this line of thinking ‘requires the repeated debunking of the more overheated Realist claims ... it is important not to throw the baby out with the bathwater: ... the competitive and self-interested aspects of international politics are not to evaporate’ (Butfoy 1997:130). Consequently, what is required is the gradual reconstruction of the strategic environment in a manner which will facilitate less malign forms of policy.
Environmental Security Shell
The affirmative claims to help Africans, but in fact they speak from a position of privilege, where claims of aid through environmental security mask the domination and securitization of the Other.
Jon Barnett, Senior Lecturer, School of Anthropology, Geography, and Environmental Studies, University of Melbourne; Ph.D., Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies, 2K, “Destabilizing the Environment-Conflict Thesis,” Review of International Studies 26(2): 271–288.
This population-environment-conflict reasoning is captured in an early pronouncement by Robert MacNamara (former US Secretary of Defense and former President of the World Bank), who said in 1984 that: ‘short of thermonuclear war itself, population growth is the gravest issue the world faces over the decades immediately ahead’.40 We should be immediately suspicious when pronouncements likening population growth to nuclear war come from key figures in the Northern world order such as MacNamara; whose ‘world’ is MacNamara referring to? If MacNamara the philanthropist is talking here about the plight of those who are adversely affected by rapid population growth and famine, then the ‘world’ in question may be that of the Southern people at the receiving end of the exploitative, poverty-making global economy. This ‘world’ is at risk from those very institutions with which MacNamara is so familiar—the World Bank, the Pentagon, and Ford motor company. More probably, MacNamara the former US defence secretary is referring to the world of US interests and the possibility that the growth in the number of Others might undermine the stability of (Northern) world order. In environmental security discourse, claims to the ‘global’ often mask the pursuit of the industrialized world’s interests.41 So it seems that the ‘world’ view of MacNamara is the view that comes with a position of power; the view that comes from directing aircraft carriers and satellites, and from granting billion dollar loans and shaping national economies to fit the global economy. The ‘world’ in question is the world of the wealthy and powerful.
[Insert and Retag A Disease Link from Critical IR file]
Environmental Security Shell
Moreover, the affirmative’s construction of the environment as a threat manifests an ecogeographic mapping of the world. This maintains an inside/outside dichotomy that separates risky spaces from safe spaces.
Simon Dalby, Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, Carleton University, 2K, Environmental Security
[Insert Coviello]
Environmental Security Shell
We turn water: The discourse of “water wars” is a self-fulfilling prophecy insofar as the water domain is constituted by discourse itself. This mode of logic denies the possibility of alternatives through dominating and regularizing discourse. We must engage this violence through critical reflexivity.
Anton du Plessis, Department Header, Institute for Security Studies [South African Organization], 2K, Green Cross International and AWIRU, African Dialogue Monograph Series No. 2, Water Wars: Enduring Myth or Impending Reality, “Charting the Course of the Water Discourse through the Fog of International Relations Theory,” Google Scholar.
It is obvious that none of the contributions represent the tributary reflectivist alternative(s), either explicitly or implicitly. At times, some do depart from the dominant paradigm and scientific approach, as evidenced by cursory references to normative and ethical issues, social history and a super- ficial questioning of state dominance. The water discourse as represented, never critically questions either its ontological, epistemological or method- ological assumptions. Neither is the substance and direction of the discourse itself, critically or reflectively questioned. Hence, from a reflectivist point of view, the issue is not so much the presence of reflectivist modalities, but their absence. In this respect, the critical, reflectivist discourse is, to a significant extent, marginalised and at times even silent. The extent of this reality, and the attribution of its causes, are vocifer- ously dealt with by Swatuk and Vale (2000). In fact, they are ‘swimming upstream’ in relation to the current course of the water discourse, as they criticise the water capture effect of the Homer-Dixon thesis; deconstruct the discourse by identifying major problems associated with it and its resultant policy programmes (which by turn is racist, modernist, statist, capitalist, liberalist, technicist/militarist, exclusive and supportive of the status quo); and propose a strategy for subverting this discourse as a prerequisite for reconstructing it (the need for a change in thinking, language, focus and practice). The essence of this is twofold. On the one hand, it is contended (implicitly) that the water domain is predominantly a product of the theoret- ical tenets and contents of the prevailing water discourse itself, and that consequently, ‘water theory’ is in fact a constitutive of the reality it purports to explain. On the other hand, it is contended (explicitly) that the discursive elite – comprising those persons who are in a dominant position within bureaucratic entities, and who can determine the nature, form and content of the prevailing water discourse (also known as the sanctioned discourse) – act as ‘guardians’ or ‘gatekeepers’ in order to dominate, legitimise and sanction the prevailing discourse, thereby leading to the creation of a dominant paradigm for the water discourse, within which the ‘normal’ science of water is conducted. Consequently, the critique matches, to a significant extent, the tenets of critical reflectivism in a post-positivist mode.
We’ll turn hegemony as well; securitizing the environment militarizes the domestic sphere, causing the institution of coercive practices towards developing nations which devastate global soft power.
Paul Benjamin, Foreign Policy Analyst; Master’s Degree, International Relations, Central European University, Budapest, 2K, Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa369.pdf
New Directions: The Price of Security Not the least of the dangers entailed by the expansion of the concept of security is militarization of environmental policy. It is true that civilian agencies such as the EPA are involved in the execution of environmental security policy. However, granting the agency the status of executor of national security policy is one step toward militarization of its activities, particularly as it works closely with DoD, and sets a dangerous precedent. The involvement of DoD in civilian affairs, on the other hand, does not bode well for openness and civil liberties. Effects on Society The effects of military interference in the domestic sphere were amply demonstrated on May 20, 1997, when an 18-year-old boy from Redmond, Texas, was shot dead by four Marines conducting an anti-drug surveillance mission on the U.S.-Mexican border.4 3 Military officials were also involved in the fatal siege at Waco in 1993, and increasing militarization of law enforcement is evident throughout the United States.44 Unfortunately, the essons of those events have not been widely understood. On October 7, 1999, DoD announced the formation of a task force, under the new U.S. Joint Forces Command, dedicated to assisting civilian officials with counterterrorism efforts. DoD also assigned the task of tackling so-called cyberterrorism in America to the U.S. Space Command.4 5 Although many DoD environmental programs are currently implemented overseas, the logical extension of a policy that posits all environmental degradation as a threat to national security is that the military will become involved in the domestic sphere. Even overseas, DoD’s activities have important implications for civil-military relations and civil liberties. Environmental initiatives carried out in Africa under the Security Assistance Program may be dangerous because they use the local military as the primary agent of conservation. Simon Dalby has pointed out the problems of “super park wardens” in developing countries: a tendency toward coercive practices, histories of political repression of and violence against those whom the “wardens” claim to protect, and enforcement of conservation areas such as game reserves where title to the land is still disputed by local peoples. There are also huge dangers in providing any kind of assistance to Third World militaries, given their record of usurping civilian governments. By overseeing such programs and funding Third World militaries, DoD may end up an agent of repression rather than of environmental protection, which would lead to further anti- American feeling around the world.
Environmental Security Shell
Alternative Text: Vote negative to critically engage with the assumptions of environmental securitization.
Simon Dalby, Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, Carleton University, 1999, Contested Grounds
Environmental Security Shell
In discussing water we must prioritize discourse before the plan—it’s critical to understand the underlying realities through which the aff is structured.
Anton du Plessis, Department Header, Institute for Security Studies [South African Organization], 2K, Green Cross International and AWIRU, African Dialogue Monograph Series No. 2, Water Wars: Enduring Myth or Impending Reality, “Charting the Course of the Water Discourse through the Fog of International Relations Theory,” Google Scholar.
Introduction
Apart from being part of life, water is as old as life itself. Through the ages humankind has always demonstrated an acute awareness of the significance of water. However, in a world preoccupied with traditional security concerns of a ‘high-politics’ nature, water has, on rare occasions, become the focal point of international relations. The ending of the Cold War, however, introduced a sea change by precipitating the (re)emergence of the so-called water discourse as a distinct and highly topical field of practical and scholarly concern. The fluid (and often turbulent and opaque) nature of water vividly depicts the way in which it is currently being addressed as a common ‘issue-field’, at the level of technocratic problem-solving, political rhetoric and academic discourse. Furthermore, since it is impossible to limit the ramifications of water (more specifically water scarcity) to a particular functional domain, the discourse extends to issues of economics, development, the environment, security and human rights. Consequently, based on perceptions of water as a global common and a shared concern, and resulting from the interdependence of and interactions between international actors, water complexes (and the complexities of water) have become an integral part of contemporary world politics. Given the topical and salient nature of water as a scarce resource in southern and South Africa, it is not surprising that the past decade has seen a deluge of conferences, publications, research projects and even research institutions on water, all of which add substance to the discourse. Apart from the technocratic studies and projects of an applied hydrological nature, contributions have also emerged from the social and political sciences, and the discipline of international relations in particular. Influenced by foreign scholars such as Glieck (1993), Ohlsson (1995), Homer-Dixon (1994, 1996), Okidi (1997), Percival (1997), Percival and Homer-Dixon (1998), Allan (1999) and Fleming (1999), local contributions include those undertaken by Hudson (1996), Solomon (1996), Van Wyk (1998), Meissner (1999) and Turton (1999). These studies are mainly concerned with environmental secu- rity, resource security, water (in)security, water scarcity, water conflict and water cooperation, as well as the management of these issues at a policy level. Apart from clarifying concepts and (axiomatically) subscribing to particular theoretical tenets regarding water resources as an environmental, developmental or security concern, the above do not self-consciously repre- sent a distinct type of international relations theorising. Nor do they explicitly contextualise the water discourse in a particular theoretical mode, and they do not purposively construct a theory of water politics within the broader ambit of any specified paradigm or theoretical framework of international relations. Apart from Turton (1999), who comes close to the latter in a predominantly positivist context, the most notable exception is the critique levelled against the current water discourse by Swatuk and Vale (2000), which represents a post-positivist, reflectivist mode of theorising. Does this state of affairs imply that the local water discourse is, for the most part, devoid of theoretical substance, or that it does not represent a particular type of theorising? No. On the contrary, the water discourse is steeped in theory, albeit implicit or subliminal. However, owing to several factors, it sheds little light on theory as such. On the one hand, most participants and stakeholders who enter from beyond the political field are unfamiliar with the broad contours of international relations theory. Therefore, they tend to be importers of non-political theoretical constructs (a beneficial, interdisciplinary practice not to be frowned upon). After all, they are neither scholars, nor theorists of international relations. On the other hand, some scholars and analysts within the discipline are similarly unfamiliar with international theory, or tend to address issues in an atheoretical or delib- erately non-theoretical context. Hence, they declare no specific theoretical position and often fail to produce analyses with distinctive international rela- tions features. Those who do provide a theoretical framework – either explicitly or implicitly – often do so with scant concern for the theoretical positions they occupy or, to paraphrase Boucher (1998:6), justify their theory in terms of its practical relevance, in keeping with the intensely practical nature of the subject matter under discussion. After all, water is the issue of immediate or practical concern, not international relations theory — or so it appears. Does this mean that the current water discourse is at sea when it comes to theory? Obviously not. However, what has to be borne in mind is that the superficial, shared concern with water at the operational level, as evidenced by its manifestation as a non-common interest in pursuit of uncommon secu- rity, has a divisive effect that transcends practice and penetrates the already divided realm of international relations theory. Consequently, the passage from practice to theory is not as smooth as may appear at first glance, and this has far-reaching implications. Two arguments suffice. Firstly, it is often contended that the aim of the social sciences is merely to systematise and formalise knowledge of the world (Ringmar 1997:284). From a positivist posi- tion, theoretical explanations will be true to the extent that they accurately reflect empirical reality. However, since the meaning of facts is not a factual question but a (meta)theoretical one, theory gains in epistemological and ontological significance. Hence, the notion that ‘there is nothing so practical as a good theory’, attains new meaning (Neufeld 1994:12). Secondly, since fields of study concerning commonly agreed upon subject matter are politically constructed, the limitations of particular theoretical constructs which focus on the specified field should be carefully assessed (Cox & Sjolander 1994:4-5).
The affirmative discourse of danger on water institutes a broader process of environmental securitization where environmental degradation begins to be represented as a threat. This process has empirically legitimized the domination and oppression of southern societies, which turns case.
Anton du Plessis, Department Header, Institute for Security Studies [South African Organization], 2K, Green Cross International and AWIRU, African Dialogue Monograph Series No. 2, Water Wars: Enduring Myth or Impending Reality, “Charting the Course of the Water Discourse through the Fog of International Relations Theory,” Google Scholar.
Thirdly, the water discourse is concerned with, and inextricably linked to, the concept of security. This concern extends to environmental security in general, and to water security in particular. This latter focus, and its collateral theoretical conceptualizations are forced upon the scene by specifically linking the water discourse – in this publication – to the war/peace and conflict/cooperation problematique, and by considering water to be a poten-tial source or cause of (violent) conflict. This idea, although not new, has become more widespread since the end of the Cold War. The result is the emergence of a new strategic imperative expressed by the term ‘environ- mental security’. This addresses the environmental factors behind potentially violent conflicts, and the impact of global environmental degradation on the well-being of societies and economies (Porter 1998:215). This development is, in part, the result of the ‘new’ security paradigm that has broadened and deepened the security agenda by including non-military (‘low-politics’) threats, as well as non-state, security stakeholders at all levels of society. Hence, it is also linked to the notion of common security, which has as its foundation common interests that, at a minimum, requires a shared interest in survival (Butfoy 1997:126). Irrespective of the fact that post-1989 security has acquired a wider meaning than protection from military threat, its broader conceptualisation has paradoxically contributed to the securitisation and militarisation of water as a traditional non-military concern. Consequently, socio-cultural factors have been overlooked, and even suppressed. The arguments about global dangers are understood in very different terms by the south, which is often regarded as a main source of these ‘new threats’ (Dalby 1998:183). Part of this concern is due to the debate about environmental security, which also involves sustainable development as a formulation that can allow injustice and environmental degradation to continue as part of the ideologically refurbished processes of development, as well as the processes of enclosure and displacement that divide up and control space. Thus viewed from the south, the ‘discourses of danger’ that structure the environmental security literature are often seen as attempts to reassert domination of southern societies, albeit in the name of protecting the planet (Dalby 1998:183-185). Also linked to this is the politics of securitisation, which is seen as an attempt to take the politics out of water, but has perhaps ultimately benefited the security of international actors more than that of the intended local beneficiaries. Warner (1999a/b) argues that a repoliticising and desecuritisng process will be necessary in order for progress to be made. However, in the words of Butfoy (1997:130), although this line of thinking ‘requires the repeated debunking of the more overheated Realist claims ... it is important not to throw the baby out with the bathwater: ... the competitive and self-interested aspects of international politics are not to evaporate’ (Butfoy 1997:130). Consequently, what is required is the gradual reconstruction of the strategic environment in a manner which will facilitate less malign forms of policy.
Environmental Security Shell
The affirmative claims to help Africans, but in fact they speak from a position of privilege, where claims of aid through environmental security mask the domination and securitization of the Other.
Jon Barnett, Senior Lecturer, School of Anthropology, Geography, and Environmental Studies, University of Melbourne; Ph.D., Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies, 2K, “Destabilizing the Environment-Conflict Thesis,” Review of International Studies 26(2): 271–288.
This population-environment-conflict reasoning is captured in an early pronouncement by Robert MacNamara (former US Secretary of Defense and former President of the World Bank), who said in 1984 that: ‘short of thermonuclear war itself, population growth is the gravest issue the world faces over the decades immediately ahead’.40 We should be immediately suspicious when pronouncements likening population growth to nuclear war come from key figures in the Northern world order such as MacNamara; whose ‘world’ is MacNamara referring to? If MacNamara the philanthropist is talking here about the plight of those who are adversely affected by rapid population growth and famine, then the ‘world’ in question may be that of the Southern people at the receiving end of the exploitative, poverty-making global economy. This ‘world’ is at risk from those very institutions with which MacNamara is so familiar—the World Bank, the Pentagon, and Ford motor company. More probably, MacNamara the former US defence secretary is referring to the world of US interests and the possibility that the growth in the number of Others might undermine the stability of (Northern) world order. In environmental security discourse, claims to the ‘global’ often mask the pursuit of the industrialized world’s interests.41 So it seems that the ‘world’ view of MacNamara is the view that comes with a position of power; the view that comes from directing aircraft carriers and satellites, and from granting billion dollar loans and shaping national economies to fit the global economy. The ‘world’ in question is the world of the wealthy and powerful.
[Insert and Retag A Disease Link from Critical IR file]
Environmental Security Shell
Moreover, the affirmative’s construction of the environment as a threat manifests an ecogeographic mapping of the world. This maintains an inside/outside dichotomy that separates risky spaces from safe spaces.
Simon Dalby, Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, Carleton University, 2K, Environmental Security
[Insert Coviello]
Environmental Security Shell
We turn water: The discourse of “water wars” is a self-fulfilling prophecy insofar as the water domain is constituted by discourse itself. This mode of logic denies the possibility of alternatives through dominating and regularizing discourse. We must engage this violence through critical reflexivity.
Anton du Plessis, Department Header, Institute for Security Studies [South African Organization], 2K, Green Cross International and AWIRU, African Dialogue Monograph Series No. 2, Water Wars: Enduring Myth or Impending Reality, “Charting the Course of the Water Discourse through the Fog of International Relations Theory,” Google Scholar.
It is obvious that none of the contributions represent the tributary reflectivist alternative(s), either explicitly or implicitly. At times, some do depart from the dominant paradigm and scientific approach, as evidenced by cursory references to normative and ethical issues, social history and a super- ficial questioning of state dominance. The water discourse as represented, never critically questions either its ontological, epistemological or method- ological assumptions. Neither is the substance and direction of the discourse itself, critically or reflectively questioned. Hence, from a reflectivist point of view, the issue is not so much the presence of reflectivist modalities, but their absence. In this respect, the critical, reflectivist discourse is, to a significant extent, marginalised and at times even silent. The extent of this reality, and the attribution of its causes, are vocifer- ously dealt with by Swatuk and Vale (2000). In fact, they are ‘swimming upstream’ in relation to the current course of the water discourse, as they criticise the water capture effect of the Homer-Dixon thesis; deconstruct the discourse by identifying major problems associated with it and its resultant policy programmes (which by turn is racist, modernist, statist, capitalist, liberalist, technicist/militarist, exclusive and supportive of the status quo); and propose a strategy for subverting this discourse as a prerequisite for reconstructing it (the need for a change in thinking, language, focus and practice). The essence of this is twofold. On the one hand, it is contended (implicitly) that the water domain is predominantly a product of the theoret- ical tenets and contents of the prevailing water discourse itself, and that consequently, ‘water theory’ is in fact a constitutive of the reality it purports to explain. On the other hand, it is contended (explicitly) that the discursive elite – comprising those persons who are in a dominant position within bureaucratic entities, and who can determine the nature, form and content of the prevailing water discourse (also known as the sanctioned discourse) – act as ‘guardians’ or ‘gatekeepers’ in order to dominate, legitimise and sanction the prevailing discourse, thereby leading to the creation of a dominant paradigm for the water discourse, within which the ‘normal’ science of water is conducted. Consequently, the critique matches, to a significant extent, the tenets of critical reflectivism in a post-positivist mode.
Environmental Security Shell [vs. Serrano/Strange]
We’ll turn hegemony as well; securitizing the environment militarizes the domestic sphere, causing the institution of coercive practices towards developing nations which devastate global soft power.
Paul Benjamin, Foreign Policy Analyst; Master’s Degree, International Relations, Central European University, Budapest, 2K, Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa369.pdf
New Directions: The Price of Security Not the least of the dangers entailed by the expansion of the concept of security is militarization of environmental policy. It is true that civilian agencies such as the EPA are involved in the execution of environmental security policy. However, granting the agency the status of executor of national security policy is one step toward militarization of its activities, particularly as it works closely with DoD, and sets a dangerous precedent. The involvement of DoD in civilian affairs, on the other hand, does not bode well for openness and civil liberties. Effects on Society The effects of military interference in the domestic sphere were amply demonstrated on May 20, 1997, when an 18-year-old boy from Redmond, Texas, was shot dead by four Marines conducting an anti-drug surveillance mission on the U.S.-Mexican border.4 3 Military officials were also involved in the fatal siege at Waco in 1993, and increasing militarization of law enforcement is evident throughout the United States.44 Unfortunately, the essons of those events have not been widely understood. On October 7, 1999, DoD announced the formation of a task force, under the new U.S. Joint Forces Command, dedicated to assisting civilian officials with counterterrorism efforts. DoD also assigned the task of tackling so-called cyberterrorism in America to the U.S. Space Command.4 5 Although many DoD environmental programs are currently implemented overseas, the logical extension of a policy that posits all environmental degradation as a threat to national security is that the military will become involved in the domestic sphere. Even overseas, DoD’s activities have important implications for civil-military relations and civil liberties. Environmental initiatives carried out in Africa under the Security Assistance Program may be dangerous because they use the local military as the primary agent of conservation. Simon Dalby has pointed out the problems of “super park wardens” in developing countries: a tendency toward coercive practices, histories of political repression of and violence against those whom the “wardens” claim to protect, and enforcement of conservation areas such as game reserves where title to the land is still disputed by local peoples. There are also huge dangers in providing any kind of assistance to Third World militaries, given their record of usurping civilian governments. By overseeing such programs and funding Third World militaries, DoD may end up an agent of repression rather than of environmental protection, which would lead to further anti- American feeling around the world.
Environmental Security Shell
Alternative Text: Vote negative to critically engage with the assumptions of environmental securitization.
Simon Dalby, Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, Carleton University, 1999, Contested Grounds
Environmental Security Shell
In discussing water we must prioritize discourse before the plan—it’s critical to understand the underlying realities through which the aff is structured.
Anton du Plessis, Department Header, Institute for Security Studies [South African Organization], 2K, Green Cross International and AWIRU, African Dialogue Monograph Series No. 2, Water Wars: Enduring Myth or Impending Reality, “Charting the Course of the Water Discourse through the Fog of International Relations Theory,” Google Scholar.
Introduction
Apart from being part of life, water is as old as life itself. Through the ages humankind has always demonstrated an acute awareness of the significance of water. However, in a world preoccupied with traditional security concerns of a ‘high-politics’ nature, water has, on rare occasions, become the focal point of international relations. The ending of the Cold War, however, introduced a sea change by precipitating the (re)emergence of the so-called water discourse as a distinct and highly topical field of practical and scholarly concern. The fluid (and often turbulent and opaque) nature of water vividly depicts the way in which it is currently being addressed as a common ‘issue-field’, at the level of technocratic problem-solving, political rhetoric and academic discourse. Furthermore, since it is impossible to limit the ramifications of water (more specifically water scarcity) to a particular functional domain, the discourse extends to issues of economics, development, the environment, security and human rights. Consequently, based on perceptions of water as a global common and a shared concern, and resulting from the interdependence of and interactions between international actors, water complexes (and the complexities of water) have become an integral part of contemporary world politics. Given the topical and salient nature of water as a scarce resource in southern and South Africa, it is not surprising that the past decade has seen a deluge of conferences, publications, research projects and even research institutions on water, all of which add substance to the discourse. Apart from the technocratic studies and projects of an applied hydrological nature, contributions have also emerged from the social and political sciences, and the discipline of international relations in particular. Influenced by foreign scholars such as Glieck (1993), Ohlsson (1995), Homer-Dixon (1994, 1996), Okidi (1997), Percival (1997), Percival and Homer-Dixon (1998), Allan (1999) and Fleming (1999), local contributions include those undertaken by Hudson (1996), Solomon (1996), Van Wyk (1998), Meissner (1999) and Turton (1999). These studies are mainly concerned with environmental secu- rity, resource security, water (in)security, water scarcity, water conflict and water cooperation, as well as the management of these issues at a policy level. Apart from clarifying concepts and (axiomatically) subscribing to particular theoretical tenets regarding water resources as an environmental, developmental or security concern, the above do not self-consciously repre- sent a distinct type of international relations theorising. Nor do they explicitly contextualise the water discourse in a particular theoretical mode, and they do not purposively construct a theory of water politics within the broader ambit of any specified paradigm or theoretical framework of international relations. Apart from Turton (1999), who comes close to the latter in a predominantly positivist context, the most notable exception is the critique levelled against the current water discourse by Swatuk and Vale (2000), which represents a post-positivist, reflectivist mode of theorising. Does this state of affairs imply that the local water discourse is, for the most part, devoid of theoretical substance, or that it does not represent a particular type of theorising? No. On the contrary, the water discourse is steeped in theory, albeit implicit or subliminal. However, owing to several factors, it sheds little light on theory as such. On the one hand, most participants and stakeholders who enter from beyond the political field are unfamiliar with the broad contours of international relations theory. Therefore, they tend to be importers of non-political theoretical constructs (a beneficial, interdisciplinary practice not to be frowned upon). After all, they are neither scholars, nor theorists of international relations. On the other hand, some scholars and analysts within the discipline are similarly unfamiliar with international theory, or tend to address issues in an atheoretical or delib- erately non-theoretical context. Hence, they declare no specific theoretical position and often fail to produce analyses with distinctive international rela- tions features. Those who do provide a theoretical framework – either explicitly or implicitly – often do so with scant concern for the theoretical positions they occupy or, to paraphrase Boucher (1998:6), justify their theory in terms of its practical relevance, in keeping with the intensely practical nature of the subject matter under discussion. After all, water is the issue of immediate or practical concern, not international relations theory — or so it appears. Does this mean that the current water discourse is at sea when it comes to theory? Obviously not. However, what has to be borne in mind is that the superficial, shared concern with water at the operational level, as evidenced by its manifestation as a non-common interest in pursuit of uncommon secu- rity, has a divisive effect that transcends practice and penetrates the already divided realm of international relations theory. Consequently, the passage from practice to theory is not as smooth as may appear at first glance, and this has far-reaching implications. Two arguments suffice. Firstly, it is often contended that the aim of the social sciences is merely to systematise and formalise knowledge of the world (Ringmar 1997:284). From a positivist posi- tion, theoretical explanations will be true to the extent that they accurately reflect empirical reality. However, since the meaning of facts is not a factual question but a (meta)theoretical one, theory gains in epistemological and ontological significance. Hence, the notion that ‘there is nothing so practical as a good theory’, attains new meaning (Neufeld 1994:12). Secondly, since fields of study concerning commonly agreed upon subject matter are politically constructed, the limitations of particular theoretical constructs which focus on the specified field should be carefully assessed (Cox & Sjolander 1994:4-5).